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I.  Introduction
The justification for regulation of the safety and soundness of banks is similar in Latin America to the
justification in the industrial world.  Banks operate within a safety net of access to central bank funds in an
emergency, and they are often covered by publicly provided deposit insurance.  Both these facilities permit
banks to transfer some of their portfolio risk from shareholders to taxpayers without compensating them for the
risk they bear.  Hence, the safety net creates incentives for increased risk taking.  As a result, banks must be
supervised and regulated to restrain their ability to shift risk to the public.
While the need for bank regulation has long been recognized, the tools for regulating banks in
industrial countries have been continuously improved.  Most notably, supervisors have developed sophisticated
measures for evaluating the adequacy of bank capital.  Banks with risky commitments, including both balance
sheet and off balance sheet items, must hold more capital than banks holding safe assets.  In addition, over
the last ten years, supervisors have become more aggressive in insisting upon the adequacy of loan loss
reserves against non performing loans.  Through pressures to maintain appropriate capital levels and adequacy
of loan loss reserves, regulators have been able to restrain the growth of risky banking institutions before their
condition deteriorates to where public assistance is necessary.  Bank regulators have also developed
sophisticated tools to measure bank liquidity, which take into account commitments to deliver funds relative to
a bank=s ability to be certain of the receipt of funds.
The success of regulators in industrial countries in monitoring and constraining bank risk has led many
commentators to advocate the adoption of similar rules for capital adequacy and similar standards of asset
evaluation in Latin America as well as in other developing countries.  For example, the weaknesses of the
Mexican banking system, so evident in the aftermath of the peso devaluation crisis, have been partially blamed
on inadequacy of bank supervision, specifically in the under provision of reserves against credit losses that, in
turn, led to an overvaluation of bank capital to risk-weighted asset ratios.  It is well recognized that before capital
adequacy standards can be effectively applied to Latin America, accounting standards must be improved and
supervisory personnel must be better trained to determine whether banks are appropriately accounting for non3
performing loans. 
In this paper, however, we raise more fundamental questions about how banks in Latin America ought
to be supervised.  We consider whether the structure of wealth ownership prevailing in the region alters both
the priorities of bank supervisors and the effectiveness of industrial country supervisory ratios in assessing bank
risk in Latin America.  In particular, we question the applicability of capital-to-risk-weighted asset standards as
a means of shifting the cost of risk from the public back to bank shareholders.  We argue that the concentration
of wealtholders in Latin America and the resultant illiquidity of equity markets permit investors who control banks
to subvert the intent of capital requirements, even when the bank itself is subject to rigorous accounting
standards.  This is because investors in developing countries having majority interest in a bank can offset their
equity position in a bank with a liability position to the same bank or to a bank owned by a related party.  In
contrast, in industrial countries, where markets are large and wealth is dispersed, it is much more difficult to
finance the acquisition of a majority stake in a bank using loans from related parties.  Thus, since the quality
of capital is low, in many Latin American countries, the public safety net is severely underpriced, creating
incentives for bank risk taking greater than those present in industrial countries with better quality of bank
capital. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that well-functioning markets for equity are
necessary for enforcement of capital standards.  In other words, good markets are complementary to good
supervision. 
Consolidated supervision, which is an effective tool in industrial countries to prevent these kinds of
conflicts-of-interest, cannot mitigate these problems in Latin America unless it is extended to the non financial
as well as financial interests of bank owners. 
The high concentration of wealth and the interconnection of balance sheets of large wealtholders
implies that, in the event of a domestic financial crisis, the failure of a major investor weakens the balance
sheets of all major investors.  This causes a decline in asset values at all banks and a rapid deterioration in their
capital position, even for banks with very high capital-to-risk-weighted asset ratios.  This means that, in Latin
America, the probability that a shock resulting in the failure of a few banks will develop into a systemic banking
crisis is greater than in industrial countries.  Because supervisors are aware of this problem, they have, in many
cases, shifted their attention from capital to asset ratios to liquidity ratios.  Many countries have encouraged4
banks to hold high levels of liquid assets to total assets by imposing liquidity requirements.
Two problems arise in executing such a policy.  First, supervisors must determine whether domestic-
currency liquid assets are really liquid when banks need an asset with a stable value.  Second, they must
consider the incentives for banks to evade liquidity requirements in markets where the cost of holding liquid
assets is very high.
Although it is difficult to enforce both capital standards and liquidity standards in Latin America, this
does not mean that bank regulators are completely without signals to advise them of the relative riskiness of
banks in their markets.  While the market for bank stocks is less developed in Latin America than in the
industrial countries, the market for other bank liabilities, such as interbank borrowing and deposits, is more
attuned to risk differences across institutions than in industrial economies.  Hence, regulators can use liability
markets to assess the riskiness of banks. 
A number of policy implications follow from the analysis.  Given the current level of wealth
concentration in the region, these policy recommendations can be divided into those that can be successfully
implemented in the short run and those that will take more time to have an impact on the operation of the
market.  The latter policies are meant to mitigate the effects of wealth concentration.  In the first group, the
paper emphasizes three policy prescriptions.  First, Latin American supervisors should focus on improving the
markets that already work in Latin America, which currently are markets for bank liabilities.  For example, they
could encourage public offerings of certificates of deposit to facilitate comparing interest rates across banks.
 Full disclosure of key market rates should also be encouraged. Second, public safety nets for bank liabilities
ought to be severely limited so that risky banks face a high price for raising liabilities.  Third, macro economic
policies, such as operating procedures for monetary policy, must play a much more important role in restraining
bank risk in Latin America than in the industrial countries. In particular, accommodative monetary policies aimed
at smoothing interest rate fluctuations should be avoided.
Policies that will take some time to implement fully include achieving accounting standards for banks
equivalent to those of industrial countries, instituting consolidated supervision of the balance sheets of all the
business activities of major shareholders of banks, and requiring disclosure of these findings to the public.
Priorities must be placed on identifying the sources and quality of bank capital before bank capital-to-risk-5
weighted asset requirements can be effective.  However, no matter how good the rules, it will be difficult to
improve the quality of bank equity markets without expanding both the potential investor base and the potential
number of equity issuers in the market.  This, almost by definition, requires opening the country to unrestricted
foreign direct investment, both for financial and non financial firms.
The paper is organized as follows.  Section II provides an overview of the major ratios used by
supervisors in industrial countries to evaluate banks and assesses the conditions under which these tools are
effective.  Section III develops an accounting framework to analyze the market for bank capital in an economy
where industrial company ownership and financial company ownership are concentrated and held in common
by the same group of individuals.  The framework suggests that where wealth is concentrated, banks can
increase their capital at very low net cost to the group.  This section also presents evidence that the behavior
of bank capital in Latin America is consistent with the predictions derived from the framework.  Section IV
describes the differences in the market for liquid assets in industrial countries and in Latin America.  It then
assesses the ability of bank regulators to control bank liquidity in several Latin American markets.  Section V
considers the alternatives available to supervisors for extracting information about the quality of banks and
restraining the growth of risky banks in Latin America.   It is argued that, while bank regulators work on creating
the conditions under which the application of supervisory ratios can effectively monitor bank risk, they can use
specific market-based measures, namely liability costs, to evaluate bank risk.  These measures may even
provide better indicators of risk than in industrial countries because bank liability holders in the former region
have less confidence in the ability of supervisory systems to protect the value of their investment than investors
in the latter countries.  Section VI complements the discussion in the previous section by advancing policy
recommendations that can enhance the effectiveness of market-based supervisory tools. Section VII concludes
the paper.6
II.  Common Supervisory Tools:  Why They Work in Industrial Countries
1. Common Supervisory Tools in Industrial Countries
Regulators in industrial countries have a variety of supervisory ratios to portray the quality of bank
balance sheet and off balance sheet commitments.  These ratios are meant to convey the strength and volatility
of bank earnings, the ability of the bank to remain liquid in the face of a temporary loss of access to short-term
funding markets, the ability of banks to sustain sharp increases or declines in interest rates, and, above all, the
quality of bank credit commitments, including letters of credit and derivatives as well as traditional loans.  The
summary statistic for bank risk, which is eventually intended to include a composite assessment of both credit
and market risks, is the capital-to-risk-weighted asset ratio.
Specifically, bank supervisors use several key ratios to evaluate the quality of a bank.  First, to permit
supervisors to evaluate loan credit quality, banks must report the ratio of non performing loans to loans.  Usually
the former is defined as loans to borrowers that have interest payments overdue thirty days or more.  Banks
must also report the ratios of loan loss reserves to loans and loan loss reserves to non performing loans. 
Second, to evaluate liquidity, banks must report the ratio of liabilities immediately due, such as large, short-term
certificates of deposit, to immediately saleable assets, such as government securities for which there is a ready
market.  Liabilities immediately due are determined not necessarily by maturity but by the probability that
investors will withdraw their funds on the maturity date.  For example, a large portion of the demand deposit
base of U.S. banks actually behave as long-term funds:  depositors are reluctant to move their transaction
account to another bank, even in the face of a crisis because doing so is expensive and the deposit insurance
system is reliable.
Third, regulators use several measures of earnings quality.  Earnings volatility is measured by, among
other things, analyzing the impact of interest rate changes on bank cash flow, which is measured through
application of duration analysis of bank receipts and payments.
1  Bank earnings strength is measured by
                    
1Duration measures the current maturity of a fixed income instrument as the weighted average of the time to receipt of the
instrument=s payment stream; the weights used are the present values of the future payments to be received.  Duration analysis evaluates
the sensitivity of a bank=s assets and liabilities to changes in interest rates.7
comparing return on assets and return on equity to those of groups of similar banks, a procedure known as
peer group analysis.  Of course, for bank earnings comparisons to be meaningful, supervisors must ensure that
banks are provisioning adequately for the various risks they face out of their cash flow.  For example, banks
that underfund their loan loss reserves are also overstating their net income.  If banks accrue interest on loans
on which interest is not actually being paid, they will also overstate their income.  Hence, it is typical for
supervisors to limit the time period in which banks can accrue interest.  For example, in the U.S., it is ninety
days.
The capital-to-risk-weighted asset ratio is quickly taking on the role of summary statistic for most of the
risks enumerated above.  This is because, in theory, each of the above supervisory ratios imply an adjustment
to the value of assets and liabilities that ultimately affects the size of the banks= capital account.  For example,
an increase in loan loss reserves reduces the value of the net loan portfolio without changing the value of bank
non equity liabilities.  Hence, an increase in loan loss reserves must result in a decrease in the equity capital
account.
2  Market risks, such as bank net exposure to interest rate changes, are also being introduced as part
of the capital requirement.  Hence, if duration analysis indicates exposure, banks will find that their capital
requirement has increased.
2. Conditions Necessary for Successful Application of Ratios
                    
2If a bank increases loan loss reserves from its net cash flow, it must reduce dividends or  reduce retained earnings.  In the latter
case, the impact of provisioning on the capital account is negative.  In the former case, its effect on the capital account is less direct.  Expected
dividends decline, placing pressure on the bank to increase future payout ratios.
To make the above system work, accounting and supervisory standards must provide an accurate
portrayal of the true character of the bank balance sheet as well as off balance sheet commitments.  This is
important because the public safety net creates incentives for banks to evade supervision by misstating the risks
that it faces and overstating the size of its capital account relative to the size of its balance sheet.  Hence,
accounting rules for classification of assets must be clear and supervisors must have the skills to determine
whether the rules are being appropriately applied.  For example, bank loan documentation records must be
reliable enough for the supervisor to determine whether proper accrual of interest policies are being followed.8
The increasingly sophisticated supervisory systems covering complex risks has raised the question of
whether supervisors can adequately analyze a bank or whether they must increasingly depend on the internal
procedures for risk control administered by the banks.  For example, in the U.S., there are serious proposals
to let banks use their own internal models of risk assessment towards determining capital requirements.  The
banking industry generally supports the approach toward capital standards followed by the December 1996
Amendment to the Basle Capital Accord that permits banks to use internal models, under restricted
parameters, to evaluate market risk in relation to capital.
3  However, rather than having to rely on quantitative
input parameters set by regulators, a number of large banks have asked for flexibility in the use of their own
risk assessment models.
4  These proposals result from the fact that many regulators have recognized that they
cannot police all risks; instead, they must depend on internal mechanisms to make it in employees= interest to
ensure that risks are evaluated properly.
5
                    
3For a further discussion of the Amendment to the Basle Accord, see IMF (1996).
4See, for example, Institute of International Finance (1995).
5Support for market-based regulation is also found in the academic literature. See, for example, Goodhart (1996). In January 1996,
New Zealand implemented a new system of regulation for banks based on a market-based approach. For a discussion on this system, see
Nicholl (1996).
In contrast, the supervisors in most Latin American countries are still at the stage of trying to make the
accounting and supervisory standards stringent enough to provide a somewhat accurate portrayal of the risks
faced by a bank.  The most common failing is to provide adequate classification procedures for loan risk,
resulting in underprovisioning of loans.  However, there are hidden, and therefore perhaps more dangerous
problems.  For example, in many major markets reported balance sheets are not detailed enough to trace flows
of funds in the interbank market.  Asset classification procedures often lead to large categories for diverse
assets or other assets.  Capital account reconciliation statements are usually not provided, making it difficult
for supervisors to trace the sources of increases in bank capital from one reporting period to the next.  In some
cases, reporting periods are not even standardized across banks, making it difficult to create ratios that provide
meaningful performance comparisons across banks.  Thus, the question of internal incentive systems for risk9
management, which is now a major issue in the industrial world, seems far down the list of priorities in Latin
America.  However, even if the legal and accounting problems in Latin America were corrected so that
supervisory ratios could be accurately measured, the appropriate environment for the successful application
of supervisory ratios to constrain bank risk taking would still not exist.  In particular, even if the value of assets
could be accurately assessed, concentration of wealth in the hands of a few investors and the consequent lack
of development of a real market for equity considerably weaken bank equity to risk-weighted-asset ratios as
a regulatory tool to constrain bank risk taking.  In the following section, an accounting framework for bank
capital is presented that shows how equity market conditions affect the quality of reported bank capital.  It also
provides some evidence to support the assertion that the capital reported by many banks in Latin America may
not be a reliable constraint on bank risk taking.
III.  Equity Market Development and the Feasibility of Enforcing Capital Standards
The purpose of a capital standard is to reduce the incentive that stockholders have to take risk at the
expense of the public safety net available to banks.  This incentive originates in the fact that cost of liabilities
covered by the safety net does not fully reflect the risk of the balance sheet because the government --and,
therefore, the taxpayers-- absorbs some of the risk at a below market price.  As a result, uninsured equity
investors can capture the upside from risk taking without fully paying for the downside.  By increasing the
proportion of equity funding to insured funding,
6 regulators attempt to reduce this incentive:  by forcing equity
holders to increase their own funds at risk relative to the total risks assumed by the bank, regulators reduce
shareholders= net expected gain from risk taking.
                    
6Too big to fail doctrines often make it difficult to distringuish between insured liabilities, which are often limited to small deposits,
and other liabilities, especially short-term money market instruments.10
This general proposition about shareholder behavior would seem to apply in both developing and
industrial countries, once accounting standards in the former countries provide an accurate assessment of risk.
 However, the rest of this section attempts to demonstrate that the market and ownership structure for both
financial and non financial firms in Latin America limits the usefulness of capital requirements as an instrument
to reduce bank risk, even when industrial country accounting standards are applied.  Specifically, because
wealth in Latin America is highly concentrated, the potential market for equity capital is small, and hence
concentrated and uncompetitive.
7  Therefore, it is difficult for regulators to determine whether shareholders=
wealth is really at risk when they supply equity capital to a bank. Morever, since wealth concentration creates
incentives for investors to supply low quality bank capital, the public safety net will be severely underpriced,
creating incentives for bank risk taking greater than those existing in industrial countries where developed equity
markets discourage investors from supplying low quality capital to banks.
As an introduction to this issue, it is helpful to recount some of the concerns of regulators in industrial
countries about the quality of bank capital.  For example, regulators in the U.S. worry about Adownstreaming@
debt issued at the bank holding company level as equity to the bank owned by the holding company.
8 
Regulators worry about downstreaming for two reasons.  First, debt liabilities pay a contractual interest rate,
and hence the investor holding this security can sue in bankruptcy court if payments are not made.  A case
might arise in which the bank holding company fails to make an interest payment on its debt because one of
its non bank subsidiaries is in financial difficulty.  To meet the obligation, the holding company may attempt to
increase dividend payments from the bank to the holding company, which would weaken the bank.  Worse yet,
the holding company might attempt to increase dividend payments by forcing the bank to take increased risk.
 Second, debt securities, unlike equities, have maturities.  If, at maturity, the holding company cannot rollover
                    
7Although there are no precise estimates of wealth concentration in Latin America, there is abundant evidence on income
concentration.  For example, in industrial countries the highest decitile of the population has, on average, an income level 17 times that of the
poorest decitile.  In Latin America, this related figure is 52 times.  See Londoño (1996).
8A bank holding company is a company that holds as assets the equity of a bank or of several banks as well as other financial
companies whose business is closely realted to banking.  A bank holding company can Adownstream@ debt as equity to banks by issuing debt
as a liability and using that debt to fund its holding of bank equity.11
its debt, it would have to sell the equity of the bank.  If a market cannot be found, the bank would have to
liquidate some of its assets, reducing the capital cushion available to protect the bank insurance fund.
The rest of this section is organized as follows.  First, a simple accounting framework is developed to
demonstrate how wealth concentration coupled with an explicit or implicit safety net, acts to reduce the value
of a capital-to-risk-asset ratio as a tool for controlling bank risk in developing countries.  The second subsection
describes contrasting conditions in industrial country equity markets that make it possible for capital ratios to
be a reliable tool for managing risk in the presence of a public safety net.  The third subsection provides
evidence supporting the claims stated above. Finally, this section concludes by showing how the problems of
bank quality in Latin America become exposed during crises periods.
1. An Accounting Framework for Bank Capitalization
This subsection demonstrates that Aaccounting@ capital, even when evaluated by industrial country
accounting standards, may not represent  Areal@ capital when wealth and equity holdings are highly
concentrated.  The first example describes a simple and unrealistic case, in which individuals are permitted to
use banks they own to make loans to themselves for the purpose of injecting capital into the bank they own.
 The remaining examples assume that regulators prohibit self-lending, but, because of the concentrated nature
of wealth, they cannot prohibit reciprical loan deals among a few individuals that have almost the same
consequence.
a.  Example 1:  An individual uses a bank loan from his bank to capitalize the same bank
An obvious example of the difficulty of tracing and regulating the interrelationships among banks and
non banks is presented in Figure 1a.  An individual, Individual A, owns an industrial company, Company A,
whose equity value of 75 appears as an asset on his personal balance sheet.  This individual also holds cash
assets equal to 25.  The offsetting liability item is net worth.  Individual A decides to start a bank, Bank A. 
Assume that regulators require a minimum of 100 in capital to start a new bank, and the new bank must have
assets of 25 in cash.  Assume also that, once the bank begins taking deposits, it must hold a 25 percent reserve
to deposit ratio.  To capitalize the bank, Individual A sets up a bank balance sheet with two accounting entries.12
 The first is a bank loan of 75 from Bank A to individual A as an asset item.  The second is a liability item,
labelled capital, also to 100.  Individual A buys stock in bank A worth 100.  His means of payment is 25 in cash
and 75 in loans from Bank A.
As a result of these transactions, Individual A=s balance sheet now consists of equity in both the bank
and the company of 100 and 75, respectively.  His liabilities are now 100 in net worth and 75 as a loan from
Bank A (Figure 1b).  Bank A holds a loan to individual A for 75 and 25 in cash as assets.  As indicated in Figure
1c, it can now issue 100 in deposits at an interest rate that does not fully reflect the risk of the bank balance
sheet because depositors have some expectation that the public safety net will protect them.
9  The bank lends
100 to Company A.  With the new loan, Company A has more than doubled in size, as indicated in Figure 1c.
                    
9For example, where commercial paper markets exist in Latin America, interest rates are substantially above those paid on bank
deposits, whereas, in contrast, in the U.S. these rates are the same.  It should be noted that liquidity characteristics as well as risk
characteristics affect these relative rates.1314
Because the quality of bank capital in this example is extremely low, the underpricing of the public
safety net is very severe. Individual A, therefore has clearly gained by establishing a bank since his company
receives a cheap loan while his risk exposure from holding equity in the bank is offset by a liability to the same
bank.
10  Company A can even receive a loan at a below market interest rate from the bank, as a result of the
bank=s low cost liabilities.  Individual A therefore obtains a capital gain on the project funded by the low cost
loan.  If Company A goes bankrupt, the equity in Bank A disappears because the company defaults on its loan.
 Depositors, realizing the bank has no equity, run the bank, taking the 25 in cash but losing the remaining 75
of their deposits, for which they expect compensation from the insurance fund.  Individual A has gone bankrupt
because his equity in the company as well as in the bank have no value.
Thus, the individual has established a bank to provide 100 in capital to his firm at the risk of losing 25,
which is his cash investment.  The remaining 75 in equity he places in the bank has no cost to him since this
asset is offset by a liability to the same banking institution.  If the asset fails to perform, he offsets it with a failure
to pay his liability.  The individual will be willing to risk his 25 in cash to establish a bank if the expected return
on the cheap loan he can make to his company offsets the expected cost of losing the cash.  Obviously, the
lower the cost of bank liabilities --because of the underpricing of the safety net-- and the more the company
can borrow from the bank, the more likely the individual is to establish a bank.  Notice that, in the absence of
regulation or market forces that constrain the expansion of the bank, after the initial investment of cash in the
bank, increasing capital to the bank is essentially costless because for every dollar he increases bank capital,
he can offset the transaction with a similar liability to the bank.
11  We next consider how a regulator might
prevent related parties from supplying costless equity to their banks. 
b.  Example 2:  Bank owners cannot capitalize a bank by borrowing from the bank they own.
                    
10The conditions in the equity market are also likely to create monopoly power in banks as well, which will also keep deposit rates
below competitive levels. 
11Depositors, however, must be willing to put cash into the bank to permit it to expand.
One possibility is to prevent banks from lending money to the individuals that own them, that is, relaxing
the assumption in example 1.  Several potential bank owners can get around this regulation, however, by15
lending to each other to establish banks, a case illustrated in Figure 2a.  In this figure, two individuals, A and
B, each own an industrial company, also A and B.  Each company has issued 75 in equity, which is owned by
the respective individuals and funded by net worth, as before.  Each individual also holds 25 in cash.
Since it is illegal for a bank to lend funds to its major shareholders, the two individuals must establish
banks by borrowing from the other individual=s bank, as indicated in Figure 2b.  Individual A transfers 25 in cash
to Bank A, which makes a loan of 75 to Individual B.  The bank issues 100 in equity to Individual A, who buys
the equity with 25 in cash and with a loan of 75 from Bank B.  Individual B buys 100 in equity in Bank B with 25
in cash and a loan of 75 from Bank A.  The two banks now take deposits of 100 and make loans of 100 to
Companies A and B respectively.  (See Figure 2b.)
Assume, as before, that Company A goes bankrupt.  Individual A loses the equity in Company A, and
equity in Bank A disappears since Company A defaults on its loan from Bank A.  Depositors run Bank A, taking
the cash.  They also demand payment of Individual B=s loan of 75, which he repays by turning over to them the
equity in Bank B.  Individual A now has no income to pay his bank loan to Bank B, so equity in Bank B falls to
25, the value of the cash in the bank.  Depositors in Bank A, therefore, have claim to cash in Bank A as well
as three quarters of the remaining equity in Bank B.  Bank B depositors now become skeptical about the quality
of their bank and stage a run, but since Company B is still solvent, they obtain the full value of their deposits.
Individual B retains control of his company, but he loses three quarters of the value of his invested cash
to depositors in former Bank A.  He must therefore weigh the value of his gain through access to cheap credit
against his expected loss in cash before entering into a reciprical loan contract between his bank and Individual
A=s bank.  This, of course, is the same calculation that A makes when he borrows money from his own bank.
 Thus, reciprocal loans expose A and B to risk that the other=s bank will go into default, implying that investors
need a higher expected rate of return than in the previous example.  However, if both banks fail, risk positions
are the same as if each bank had lent funds to its owner.
To make this case equivalent to the case in which each individual borrows from his own bank, the two
individuals must find a way to protect their cash in their bank if the other bank should go bankrupt. One way to
do this would be to sell minority shares in the banks, asking the minority shareholders to put up the cash.  This,16
of course, would only be possible if disclosure requirements were weak and minority shareholders inattentive
to the potential risk of the equity they purchase.  Given the state of disclosure requirments in many Latin
American countries, it may be possible to structure these kinds of deals.
c.  Example 3:  Banks cannot lend to related parties.
Regulators might still try to foil the schemes of Individuals A and B by prohibiting ownership of industrial
companies and banks by the same individual, that is, relaxing an assumption in example 2.
12   This regulation,
however, may be harder to enforce than the regulation prohibiting bank loans to owners of banks because, as
is typical in some Latin American markets, wealth may be too concentrated to permit separation of ownership.
  Nevertheless, assuming that this regulation is enforceable, we now determine whether its existence changes
incentives to establish banks with reciprical loans.
                    
12Even in the U.S., a single individual can own both a bank and an industrial company, although common ownership by a holding
company is prohibited.17
As before and indicated in Figure 3, Banks A and B now make loans to Individuals B and A,
respectively, of 75.  Each individual contributes 25 in cash to buy equity in his bank equal to 100.  Each bank
issues 100 in deposits to make loans to companies that are not related to Individuals A or B.  Because the
banks can still have access to low cost liabilities from stockholders= point of view owing to underpriced
insurance, banks can earn exceptional profits directly from loans rather than through subsidized loans to related
companies.  Assume that Bank A=s loan to unrelated parties goes into default.  The capital of Bank A
disappears, and the depositors run the bank, taking the 25 in cash and demanding repayment of Bank A=s loan
to Individual B.  Instead, Individual B turns over 75 of his equity in Bank B to depositors of Bank A.  Since Bank
A is bankrupt, Individual A ceases payment on his loan of 75 to Bank B, handing over worthless equity in Bank
A to Bank B.  Bank B=s equity value has now fallen to 25, equal to the value of the cash in the bank.  Again,
Individual B potentially loses three fourths of his cash to depositors in Bank A.  Therefore, joint ownership of
a bank and an industrial company is not necessary to make the establishment of a bank extremely profitable.
 The only necessary condition is concentration of wealth in an environment where an explicit or implicit safety
net is present.  The latter assumption is necessary because small, concentrated equity markets are necessary
for transactions such as those described in the accounting framework to take place.
13  In the next subsection,
we show why such transactions are highly unlikely to occur in large industrial economies with dispersed wealth.
                    
13It might be argued that regulators could effectively prohibit the transactions presented in Figure 3 by prohibiting individuals from
funding bank equity with loans from any source.  This regulation, however, would be difficult to enforce as individuals could create shell
companies whose stock is held by an individual.  That individual funds the shell company=s stock with a bank loan.  The shell company then
holds the equity of the bank.1819
2. A Stylized Equity Market in Industrial Countries
As economies become larger, the evidence from large industrial countries suggests that two things
happen that have an important consequence for the market for bank stock, which we assumed in the previous
section was illiquid.  The first is that the size of non financial enterprises increases.  This requires the assembly
of larger pools of capital to supply these organizations with funds.
14  The second is that the wealth holding
becomes more dispersed, implying that individual balance sheets grow at a slower rate than the economy as
a whole. 
The first factor implies that, as economies become larger, the need for large banks increases, since
large firms need a large pool of short-term funds.
15  Prudentially, banks must limit their exposures to single
borrowers as a percent of capital.
16  The second factor, coupled with the first, implies that outside investors
will hold a larger portion of bank stocks as economies become larger.
                    
14There are, of course, many large banks in Latin America relative to the size of their economies.  But these banks are much smaller
than the large banks of major industrial countries that pool capital from sources worldwide. Moreover,  in the recent trend of merges and bank
consolidation in several Latin American countries, foreign capital has been often present.
15Firms also diversify their funding sources as they become large, causing, for example, an expansion of equity markets.
16Bank funds can be mobilized to lend to a single large borrowower through the loan syndication market rather than through an
expansion of a single bank=s balance sheety.  However, a single bank often provides a credit line to a single borrower that, if use, becomes
a syndicated loan.  Credit line exposure to a single borrower represents a risk that must be diversified with a relatively large balance sheet.
 In addition, it takes a fairly large bank to assemble a large pool of lenders into a syndication group.  These groups are typicially managed by
large wholesale banks.  In addition, some analysts argue that there are operating economies of scale in banking.  However, operating
economies of scale imply deconcentration as markets expand rather than an expansion in bank size.
These two factors change the dynamics of the accounting framework described above.  First, it is no
longer possible for a single wealtholder or a small group of wealtholders to assemble enough cash to purchase
a significant share of a large bank.  This implies that outside shareholders must play a bigger role in the
capitalization of large banks than they do in developing countries.  Second, in developing markets large
wealtholders can supply leveraged capital -- that is, equity funded with loans -- to a bank and still maintain the
confidence of outside investors such as depositors because of the relative strength and size of their overall20
balance sheet relative to their investment in bank capital.  In contrast, in large markets with dispersed wealth,
an individual would have to borrow too much money relative to his net worth to make his majority interest
investment in a large bank believable.  Also, it would be more risky to form reciprocal lending relationships as
described above.  This is because each party=s exposure to the other party=s bank would increase relative to
his net worth as the leverage ratio of each investor increased.  Hence, it is likely that part of the equity
investment would have to be funded by third party lenders whose expected return on investment does not
include the benefits of reciprical lending described above.  Outside lenders would subject proposed loans to
more severe credit tests than reciprical lenders.
All of the above factors lead to a reduction in insider ownership relative to outsider ownership, which
increases the incentive for insiders to manage the bank in their interests rather than in the interests of all
shareholders.  For example, insiders can place themselves in positions of senior management and take high
salaries out of the bank, reducing dividends to outsiders.
17  However, in order for banks to attract the outside
investors they need, institutions and bank behavior must change to provide assurance that outsider investor
interests will be protected.  It is now in the interest of the bank to provide disclosure concerning insider equity
holding.  Banks must demonstrate to outside investors that internal controls prevent managers from playing
the role of insiders by increasing perqs.  The ultimate protector of outsider shareholder interests is the market
for takeovers, which mobilizes multitudes of small shareholders to act as a single shareholder. The increase
in market size, the dispersion of wealth, and the institution of minority shareholder protections reduce the
possibility that equity can be injected into banks at only marginal risk to the investor. As a result, equity injections
under these conditions represent a real transfer of risk from the general public to shareholders. This, in turn,
reduces the underpricing of a safety net from the stockholder point of view, and therefore, reduces incentives
for risk taking activities. Thus, capital standards become a viable tool for restraining bank risk in industrial
countries.
3. Empirical Evidence on the Supply of Equity
                    
17The abuses associated with leveraged holdings of bank stocks are likely to decline as markets become large.  These abuses can21
                                                                   
occur in small markets because bank owners can strike reciprical deals with offsetting loan payments to each other.  In large markets, loans
to buy bank  stocks will operate as arm=s length markets.22
As discussed above, because the high degree of concentration of wealth in Latin America relative to
that of industrial countries permits bank owners in the former region to transfer some of the risk of their
investment activities to the general public, their cost of funding is cheap.  As a result, bank owners in these
markets can extract large profits.  Risky investments can be made either to related parties at below market
rates or to unrelated parties at market rates.  Because bank owners can supply capital to their banks at very
little real cost to themselves, they can meet the demands of regulators for higher capital-to-risk-weighted asset
ratios.  The complex connections among balance sheets of major wealtholders make it difficult for regulators
to evaluate the true quality of bank capital.
The factors described in the previous paragraph should make it possible for bank owners in Latin
American countries to raise large amounts of capital relative to the capital base of their bank over a short period
of time.  Chart 1 displays the growth rate of capital, net of reevaluation adjustments to bank assets and retained
earnings, relative to real loan growth rates for Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Peru, as well as for
Japan and the U.S.
18  The data cover various years, depending on data availability.  The data presented in
Chart 1 indicate that growth rates of capital has been quite significant -- greater than 30 percent -- in at least
one year of the periods covered in all Latin American countries in the sample.  Growth rates are especially high
in Ecuador and Colombia in 1995 and Peru and Argentina in 1994.  In contrast, growth rates of capital in Japan
and the U.S. are less than 10 percent.
                    
18Retained earnings are only available for Mexico.  In the other markets we used total net earnings, which assumes all earnings
are retained.  No adjustment for asset prices was available for Peru since this item is not accounted for in the capital account.  For Argentina,
the data are for the 20 largest private banks.  Our measure of capital should approximate a real growth rate of capital since bank earnings
should include a primium for inflation to keep the real value of the balance sheet constant.  Prudent banks should retain the inflation premium
in the capaital account to keep the real value of capitial constant.  Hence, capital obtained from outside should represent increases in real
capital.23
An important reason why we might observe such a rapid growth of capital in Latin America is that bank
capital starts from a very low base relative to its level in industrial countries.
19  Thus, the data could indicate a
stock adjustment problem rather than an indication of the quality of the equity market for bank stocks.  Such
an interpretation is supported by the fact that Mexican banks raised a lot of capital in 1993 and very little in 1994
and Peruvian banks raised a lot of capital in 1994 but very little in 1995.  However, in the previous subsections,
we pointed out that the extremely small capital base in most Latin American markets is, in fact, the reason why
major wealtholders are able to control most banks in a given market.
20  Therefore, stock adjustment problems
and concentration of wealth are both characteristics of small markets.  Moreover, the fact that within a given
country the rates of growth of capital change drastically from one year to the next is further indication of the
ability of shareholders to mobilize capital quickly and easily.
Chart 1 also indicates that net equity grew at a slower rate than real loans in several markets for
several time periods.  It might be argued that this implies that banks in these markets faced problems in raising
capital.  However, as indicated in Chart 2, for those countries and time periods when net equity growth rates
were slower than real loan growth rates, the net equity to loan ratio was substantially above 8 percent, which
would meet BIS standards if loans were the only risk asset on the balance sheet.
21  It should also be noted that,
even after loan growth exceeded capital growth, equity to loan ratios remained above 8 percent.
22
                    
19Capital growth rates, as measured in Chart 1, cannot be the result of accounting overstatement of bank earnings since we have
calculated growth rates net of retained earnings.  However, growth rates can be overstated due to lack of provisioning for bad credits that would
exceed net earnings.  But if capital were needed for provisioning, it would still have to be raised from sources other than earnings, which again
raises the question of whether it is raised in a true market or not.
20Of course, not all bankers in Latin America are motivated by the forces described in the framework.  Some actually prefer to issue
equity in international markets precisely to avoid any appearance of conflict of interest.
21Since charts 1 and 2 refer to equity to loan ratios and the BIS standards refer to capital to asset ratios, the following table presents
capital to loan ratios and capital to asset ratios for selected Latin American countries.  These are not risk-weighted ratios.
22In Mexico, capital-to-risk-weighted assets are reported by Comision Nacional Bancaria y de Valores since 1991.  It is this ratio
that is used for constructing Mexican data in Chart 2.242526
4. The Role of the Equity Account in Banking Crises in Latin America
The accounting framework suggests that, when equity markets are concentrated, there is a lack of
outside investors that can replenish bank capital in a crisis.  Hence, regulators have to design programs to inject
regulatory capital into the banking system during a crisis.  In Chile in 1984, and in Mexico in 1995-96, programs
were devised to exchange non performing bank loans for indexed bonds.  This prevented banks from having
to write down the value of bad loans and permitted them to maintain the appearance of high capital ratios
during the crisis.  In contrast, in industrial countries where markets for bank stocks either exist or can be
developed, regulators can force bank stockholders to write down the value of their investment.  Hence, as a
result of market conditions, equity ratios often do not decline in Latin America during a crisis whereas they do
decline during a crisis in industrial countries.
The interconnections between banks through the financing of bank equity capital with loans from other
but related banks can contribute to the lack of market for bank assets in a crisis since it facilitates the spread
of credit problems from one bank to several banks.  For example, if an individual has purchased bank stock
with a loan from another bank, and the bank in which he owns stock fails, that individual will then default on loan
payments to the bank from which he borrowed the funds.  That is, financial fragility is greater in Latin America
because an adverse shock hitting a particular institution can quickly spread to other institutions through the
interrelationship of balance sheets, soon generating a systemic crisis.  Both these problems are mitigated in
industrial economies.  In the first case, more reliable accounting standards and loan risk classification imply that
loan loss reserves will absorb much of the shock of the deterioration in credit quality.  Second, the share of
unleveraged equity in the major banks is likely to be a higher percentage of total equity for the reasons
described above. 
In addition, in small markets, banking crises are likely to be associated with general movements in the
economy, creating high correlations between equity values of financial and non financial firms.  In contrast, in
large markets, banking crises are more likely to be regional or caused by a relatively small segment of the
economy, leading to much lower correlations between the equity values of financial and non financial firms.
 For example, in Mexico, the correlation of the financial equity index and the non financial equity index was over27
.99 from September 1994 through June 1996.
23  Thus, during the crisis, the value of all shares fell together.
 In contrast, in the U.S. in 1987, during a period of severe stress in the banking system, the correlation between
these two indexes was only .63.
These factors cause secondary markets for bank assets or for banks themselves to dry up much more
quickly than in industrial countries.  In industrial countries, assets can be sold at a discount from their face value,
and, correspondingly, the capital value of the bank can be written down.  A price can therefore be identified at
which point the bank is insolvent, and the bank can either be sold or dissolved.  If it is dissolved, regulators can
find markets for pieces of the former bank to reduce their liability to pay off insured depositors.
24
For example, in the U.S., banks and thrift institutions in Texas suffered a crisis severe enough to force
most major institutions into insolvency.  However, regulators were able to sell major Texas bank holding
companies to outside investors at prices substantially higher than the net (negative) value of financial assets
because outside capital was willing to place a postive value on the underlying distribution network and customer
connections of the bank.  The market for thrift institutions was not nearly as strong, primarily because the thrifts
had weak distribution systems and a customer base that was much more volatile than bank customer bases.
 The thrift deposit base was mostly time deposits whose customers were highly interest rate sensitive whereas
commercial bank customers used their bank mainly for transactions purposes,which created a more loyal
customer relationship.  Nevertheless, regulators could find buyers, albeit at substantial discounts, for much of
the repossessed real estate owned by thrifts. 
                    
23Correlations were calculated from equity price indices.
24For a discussion of how the lack of markets for bank assets or for banks themselves imposes severe constraints on banking
crises resolution in Latin America.  See Rojas-Suárez and Weisbrod (1996a).
Thus, in markets like the U.S., when banks get into trouble, asset values are written down, and capital
declines.  In 1987, the year that substantial losses were recognized in the Texas banking system and the year
that New York banks recognized substantial losses on their Latin American loan portfolios, capital at New York
banks fell by 14 percent and capital at other large banks fell by 6 percent.  Capital in the entire U.S. banking
system fell by 1.5 percent in that year.  Also, in Japan, in 1994, as a result of non performing loans, capital at
city banks fell by 1.5 percent.28
In contrast, in nominal terms, Mexican bank balance sheets and capital accounts expanded in 1995,
with nominal capital increasing by 40 percent.
25  Assets and liability growth was slower than inflation because
loans interest rates earned on loans and paid on deposits were below the inflation rate; hence, the real value
of loans and deposits declined.  In addition, the banking authorities swapped loans for bonds, reducing risk
asset ratios.  Thus, loan losses were partially absorbed by depositors and stockholders through inflation and
partially by the authorities.
26  But for most banks, nominal capital was not written down as a result of sale of
assets.
The fact that real debt burdens were reduced through inflationary losses absorbed by depositors rather
than by writing down the value of equity is consistent with the notion that regulators had to design government
programs to recapitalize banks rather than sell banks or bank assets at prices that would have limited
government losses to tolerable levels.  Hence, regulators had very limited capacity to use the capital account
for its designed purpose:  they could not force a write down of assets and close banks because, in reality, there
was no market for these assets within the domestic market.  The problem here is quite similar to the one
described above.  Because the balance sheets of major wealth holders are tied closely together, they all
decline at the same time.  Therefore, there is no internal wealth to support the system.  In contrast, in the U.S.,
when Texas collapsed, outside wealth came into the market, thereby reducing the government cost of a bailout.
                    
25In the U.S., declines in real and nominal capital were approximately equal because the inflation rate was low.
26The authorities did close a few small banks, forcing equity holders to lose nominal as well as real capital.29
In Argentina, capital accounts did not expand significantly in 1995 for the twenty largest private banks
as a whole.  However, arrangements for non deposit funding to troubled banks was expanded so that these
banks could meet deposit withdrawals without reducing the value of their loans portfolios.  For the twenty largest
banks as a whole, deposits fell by 4.4 percent, total liabilities increased by 4.4 percent, and total loans
increased by 4.2 in 1995.  Thus, the real value of Argentine balance sheets remained approximately constant,
indicating that loan values were not written down substantially.
27  As in the case of Mexico, this shows that
markets were not readily available for disposing of non performing bank assets.
28
IV.  Liquidity as a Constraint
As discussed in the previous section, the concentration of ownership and wealth that exists in many
Latin American markets makes it difficult to find markets for assets of failed banks or for the failed banks
themselves.  As a result, asset prices can fall much more drastically in Latin America than in the industrial
countries during a banking crisis.  Hence, capital ratios that appear healthy in normal times will not provide
much protection against bank failures in a crisis.  An alternative means of protecting the value of bank assets
relative to bank liabilities is to require banks to hold liquid assets whose value does not deteriorate in a banking
crisis.  In this section, we examine the feasibility of such a policy, and analyze the evidence of how these policies
have worked during banking crises.
This section will show that, as in the case of capital, the feasibility of an effective liquidity requirement,
depends on whether such a requirement can be enforced.  Again, this depends on the strength of the incentives
and the quality of assets used for liquidity purposes.
1. Bank Demand for Liquidity
                    
27A few large private banks reported substantial decreases in the value of their loan accounts.  In some cases, these decreases
were supported by injections of capital or by expansions in their liability accounts, indicating that loan write downs did not account for the full
loss in value of these assets.30
                                                                   
28However, as indicated in Section IV below, some banks were able to find markets for their assets during this crisis.31
Independent of reserve requirements, banks have a demand for liquid assets to meet temporary
excessive deposit withdrawals and to provide a means to meet unexpected demands for funds, such as
unforeseen requests for extension of the term of a loan.  Holding liquid assets has a cost, which is the
difference in the interest rate earned on a liquid and a non liquid asset.  This does not necessarily imply that
banks will be unwilling to hold liquid assets, however, because bank customers may be willing to absorb the
cost of these assets.  For example, depositors might be willing to accept a lower interest rate payment from
banks holding higher ratios of liquid assets to deposits if they believe that their deposits will be more liquid as
a result. Potential borrowers may be willing to pay higher fees on credit lines from banks holding high ratios of
liquid assets because they can be more certain that the bank can provide a loan under their line when liquidity
is especially tight.
Banks, however, have a wide variety of means of promising liquidity to their loan and deposit
customers.  Individual banks can contract with other banks for lines to borrow in the interbank market.  Banks
can make loans to customers whose balance sheets will remain liquid, even under extremely tight credit
conditions.  Or, they can secure access to long term floating rate funds to assure borrowers that credit will be
available under a wide variety of circumstances.  It can be argued that many of the above tools are less reliable
than liquid assets.  For example, in periods of tight liquidity, there may be no bank in the market that has excess
funds to lend in the interbank market.  Hence, bank lines will be of little use in providing liquidity to the system.
 Similarly, it may be very difficult to find borrowers whose balance sheets will remain liquid under extremely tight
credit conditions.
If banks and their customers perceive these problems, banks will find it profitable to hold a liquid asset.
 However, under conditions such as those in Latin America, it may be difficult to find such an asset.  For
example, if banks choose to hold domestic currency, or deposits at the central bank denominated in domestic
currency, they will have a liquid asset that maintains its value in domestic currency, by definition.  But if their
deposit customers should demand a foreign reserve asset in a crisis, the bank and their customers may
discover that domestic currency has become quite illiquid in terms of the foreign reserve asset.  For example,
in a financial crisis created by devaluation of the domestic currency, the price of domestic currency can fall
drastically relative to foreign reserve assets.32
Thus, to ensure liquidity, bank customers in Latin America might demand that their banks hold foreign
reserve assets.  These assets, however, will probably be very expensive to hold.  For example, it is often the
case that domestic currency financial instruments have a risk premium incorporated in their interest rate to
compensate holders for the possibility of a devaluation.  Thus, if a bank holds foreign reserve assets for liquidity,
this asset may pay an interest rate substantially below its cost of deposits. 
The bank may find it desirous to maintain credit lines with a foreign bank rather than hold liquid assets,
but, of course, this strategy may end up being more expensive if the bank eventually has to borrow large sums
at very high interest rates.  Holding liquidity in domestic currency will be cheaper in this regard as well.  For
example, a bank can maintain a domestic currency line of credit with its central bank that might be very cheap,
depending on the discount policy of the central bank.  But, just as in the case of liquid assets, a line in domestic
currency will be an inferior liquidity source relative to a line to a foreign bank denominated in foreign currency.
If, for some reason, banks and their customers underestimate the need for liquid assets on bank
balance sheets, a reserve requirement policy might be justified.  To determine when and in what form reserve
requirements are a useful regulatory tool in Latin America, we turn to empirical evidence of bank behavior in
Argentina and Mexico during the latest financial crisis.  Argentina applied a reserve requirement on bank
deposits whereas Mexico did not.
2. Empirical Evidence on the Demand for Liquidity
The reserve requirement applied to bank deposits in Argentina prior to the 1995 financial crisis was
effectively a US dollar reserve requirement.  Argentina maintained a one to one exchange rate with the US
dollar, and the central bank promised to maintain full dollar backing for the monetary base.  Hence, reserve
requirements on peso deposits were invested in US dollar liquid assets by the central bank.  Banks were also
free to issue foreign currency deposits, which were also subject to reserve requirements.  However, banks held
these reserve requirements in the form of US dollar deposits in US banks or in short-term US Treasury
securities.  Reserve requirements on both domestic and foreign currency bank deposits were 43 percent for
transaction accounts and 3 percent on time deposits.
In contrast, Mexico did not apply reserve requirements to bank deposits nor did it promise to maintain33
parity between the new peso and the US dollar.  Nevertheless, Mexican banks held liquid assets in the form
of domestic currency government securities, which, of course, could only provide liquidity protection in domestic
currency.  These securities were made highly liquid as a result of central bank policy, which effectively permitted
banks to use securities to settle their payment obligations with the Banco de Mexico beginning in March 1993.
29
 Under central bank policy, banks with deficit positions in their accounts with the central bank could, at the end
of the day, sell a government security to the central bank under a repurchase agreement, which was effectively
a collateralized loan from the central bank to the bank.  Even though these repurchase agreements had a one
day maturity, banks were guaranteed the right to roll them over:  when a bank repaid its loan, this created a
deficit in its  account with the central bank, which, it could again cover with a repurchase agreement.  Since
securities could be used to settle payments, from the bank=s point of view they were as good as cash.
Chart 3 indicates that the liquid asset to asset ratio was greater in Mexico in 1994 than it was in
Argentina, despite the fact that Mexico did not have a reserve requirement.  This suggests that it was cheaper
for Mexican banks to hold liquid assets than for banks in Argentina -- that is, the income forgone by holding
liquid assets was lower in Mexico than in Argentina.  Based on the discussion in the previous subsection, this
should not be surprising.  Banks in Mexico could hold domestic securities paying peso interest rates as liquid
securities.  The interest rate on these securities was probably close to the domestic wholesale deposit rate.
30
 In contrast, in Argentina, banks had to hold foreign reserve assets, which paid lower interest rates than
domestic deposits.
                    
29See, Banco de México (1993)
30This conjecture is based on the fact that, beginning in 1993, repurchase agreement rates on government securities were slightly
below those paid on wholesale deposits.3435
Of course, it might be argued that Mexican domestic securities were less liquid instruments than short-
term U.S. assets so that Mexican banks were not really more liquid than those in Argentina.  However, within
the context of the Mexican peso market, central bank policy was conducted to assure the liquidity of the
securities market, as indicated above. Thus, in judging liquidity needs, Mexican banks and their customers had
to determine whether they were willing to suffer the potential costs of holding a new peso security that might
become illiquid in the event of a crisis in the peso market.
One way to assess Mexican banks= attitudes with respect to the availability of local market liquidity is
to determine whether banks were willing to expand their new peso loans when domestic liquidity was relatively
cheap after the change in central bank policy in early 1993.  Here banks differentiated themselves clearly. 
Some viewed the availability of liquidity as an opportunity to expand quickly.  It is quite probable that banks that
expanded loan portfolios rapidly extended risky loans to customers whose ability to withstand a depreciation
crisis was relatively weak.  In contrast, the largest banks in Mexico displayed a lack of willingness to expand
loans rapidly.  This signified a concern for the quality of peso loans in a peso crisis by both banks and their
deposit customers.
Indeed, while the largest banks expanded their nominal loan portfolios at a 6 percent annual rate in
1993 and a 27 percent annual rate in 1994, other banks= loan portfolio grew at a 35 percent annual rate in 1993
and a 41 percent annual rate in 1994.  Also, depositors were willing to supply funds to the largest banks at an
interest rate about 400 basis points below that paid by other banks, indicating that some depositors were quite
concerned about how loan portfolios of the latter banks would fare in a new peso crisis. 
After the depreciation crisis, it became quite clear that the loan portfolios of the smaller banks as a
whole were less able to withstand the pressures created by the crisis than the loan portfolios of the largest
banks.  Thus, one important result of the easy domestic liquidity policy in Mexico was to encourage the
expansion of risky banks relative to the system as a whole, a point we will return to in the next section.36
3. Reserve Requirements as a Means of Financing Bank Runs
In a financial crisis as deep as those experienced in some Latin American countries, liquidity
requirements may play a more important role in protecting the value of deposits than capital requirements. 
After all, in 1995, many analysts claimed that Argentine banks financed deposit withdrawals by divesting cash
assets.  In contrast, the Mexican banking system experienced net nominal deposit withdrawals only after
accounting for interest credited. Hence, there was no divestiture of cash assets in the Mexican market. In this
subsection, we investigate whether reserve requirements in Argentina and lack of reserve requirements in
Mexico affected this outcome.
In 1995, among the 20 largest private banks in Argentina, the banks that experienced the largest
declines in bank deposits were those with a low ratio of transaction accounts, defined as demand deposits and
savings accounts, to total liabilities.
31  (Chart 4)  During the financial crisis, Argentine authorities reduced reserve
requirements to permit banks to finance deposit withdrawals from their stock of cash assets.  Because reserve
requirements in Argentina were substantially higher for transaction accounts than for time deposits, banks with
low ratios of transactions accounts to total deposits had much smaller cash to asset ratios (about 5 percent),
on average, than high transaction account banks (about 15 percent).  As a result, the former group of banks,
which experienced by far the most deposit withdrawals, could not finance these withdrawals by reducing cash
assets.  This, of course, left low-transaction account banks with a problem as to how to finance deposit and
liability withdrawals.
                    
31The analysis is based on the twenty largest private banks for convenience reasons.3738
Of the ten banks with the lowest transaction deposit to deposit ratio, nine experienced deposit
withdrawals.  Five of these were able to finance the withdrawals by reducing assets, sometimes at a loss in the
capital account.  While this was not particularly good news for the shareholders of these organizations, it does
indicate that there was a secondary market for some bank assets in Argentina.  The remaining four, however,
required substantial inflows of non deposit liabilities or of capital to finance deposit outflows, indicating their
asset portfolios could not be marketed to fund deposit withdrawals.  These banks likely received non deposit
funding from other banks. 
Thus, among the 20 largest private banks, some banks were able to provide liquidity to their depositors
while holding very low reserve requirements.  Hence, the Argentine experience shows that, in markets where
central bank exchange rate and operating procedures keep liquidity costs high, some banks will find ways to
create their own liquidity, even if reserve requirements are low.
32
                    
32The argument of how bank incentives to hold liquidity assets can be improved by avoiding a monetary policy aiming at smoothing
interest rate fluctuations is fully developed in Rojas-Suárez and Weisbrod (1996b).39
In Mexico, banks did not sell liquid assets to finance loan expansion or to finance deposit withdrawals.
 In fact, in contrast to Argentina, through September 1995, security to deposit ratios rose dramatically at small
banks that had previously operated with relatively little liquidity.  This is because small banks sold loans to the
authorities in exchange for securities, or they had issued subordinated debt to expand capital and invested the
proceeds in bonds.  A possible reason why depositors did not withdraw their funds and thereby force banks to
sell securities is that this transaction would have resulted in the exchange of one new peso investment (a
deposit) for another (a bond).
33  This, of course, was a consequence of the fact that the Mexican banking
system only promised liquidity in terms of domestic currency, in contrast to the Argentine system, which
promised liquidity in foreign currency.  It should be noted that the lack of liquidity in foreign currency would have
remained even if the Mexican banks had been subject to reserve requirements as long as the central bank
would have invested these reserves in domestic securities.
In comparing the Argentine and Mexican experiences, it is clear that, while liquidity ratios were higher
in Mexico, the quality of liquidity was lower.  This is because Mexican liquid assets did not maintain their value
in terms of the U.S. dollar during the crisis whereas Argentine liquid assets did.  Therefore, depositors in
Argentina had the option of withdrawing funds from the Argentine banking system and moving into U.S. dollar
assets at a fixed price. In contrat, in Mexico, if depositors would have withdrawn their funds from, they could only
have purchased U.S. dollar assets at a very high price in terms of pesos. The central bank was not in a position
to accommodate liquidity demands because these demands were for foreign currency assets.  Thus, as in the
case of capital, it is the quality of the instrument that matters for investor confidence in the system.
V.  Devising Supervisory Procedures for Latin American Banks
The data in the previous sections indicate that supervisory ratios constructed for banks in Latin America
must be interpreted with care.  Capital-to-risk-asset ratios suffer from inadequate accounting procedures as
well as more fundamental problems concerning the structure of ownership of banks, which constrains the
                    
33Since, as is well documented, the Mexican crisis took the public by surprise, massive capital flight did not precede the crisis, as
was the case during the 1982 crisis.  After the devaluation of the peso in December 1995, depositors had few choices to protect the real value
of their wealth.  A flight to U.S. dollar assets would have been expensive.  By and large, the only domestic alternative, given the lack of40
development of liquid markets for bank equity.  From an industrial country=s perspective, the Latin American
situation probably appears somewhat discouraging because regulators in industrial countries depend heavily
on equity investors to block poorly run banks from obtaining equity necessary for expansion under the capital
guidelines.  Equity investors are both uninsured and sophisticated, unlike depositors, who are assumed to have
little incentive to evaluate bank risk.  Without critical equity investors, Latin American supervisors seem to be
at a clear disadvantage to their colleagues in industrial countries.
                                                                   
developed capital markets, was to shift from bank deposits, guaranteed by the government, to another government liability.
Somewhat surprisingly, however, often times deposit markets in Latin America play a similar role as
equity markets in industrial countries, at least in terms of providing information about the quality of banks.  There
are two possible reasons for this.  The first is that risky banks offer high interest rates to uninformed depositors
to attract funds from new customers that they use to expand their portfolios of risky loans or to roll over bad
credits.  Banks must pay higher rates, even on insured deposits, because new customers have switching costs.
 The second is that sophisticated depositors attempt to obtain high yields from risky banks under the assumption
that they can withdraw their funds in time to avoid bank collapses.  Risky banks probably offer high rates for
both these reasons.  However, from the supervisor=s point of view, the major issue is whether deposit markets
can help identify risky banks.
1. Market Assessment of Banks in Countries that Have Experienced a Recent Crisis:  Argentina
and Mexico
In assessing how depositors and other liability holders value banks, it is important for regulators to
understand how business differences across different classes of banks affect liability holders= perceptions of
the risk of bank liabilities.  For example, in Argentina, among the twenty large private banks mentioned in the
previous section, the median interest rate paid on bank deposits in 1994 was higher at the high transaction
banks than at the low transaction banks.  However, the range of interest rates paid by the low transaction banks
was much wider that among the high transaction banks, indicating that the perception of quality varied much
more widely among the former group of institutions. (Table 1) 41
Table 1. Argentine Banks
Cost of Average Liabilities (1994)
Median Range
Low Transaction Banks 5.60% 8.11%
High Transaction Banks 6.61% 2.89%
Source: Banco Central de la República Argentina, ESTADOS CONTABLES DE LAS ENTIDADES FINANCIERAS, various
issues.42
After accounting for differences in liability costs related to business differences, it is possible to
determine whether depositors received higher interest rates from riskier banks.  Chart 5 ranks low transaction
banks in Argentina by interest paid on liabilities for 1994, the year prior to the financial crisis against non-deposit
liability growth in 1995.  Those banks experiencing the greatest non deposit liability growth in 1995, which
indicates an illiquid asset portfolio in the face of deposit runs, paid the highest interest rates on deposits in 1994.
 Morever, as indicated in Chart 6, among high transaction banks, those that lost the highest percentage of
deposits in 1995 had the highest interest expenses in 1994.  Thus, it appears that liability holders in Argentina
predicted fairly accurately how banks would perform during a crisis.  The perception of depositors would
probably have appeared even better if we could have identified the costs of identical instruments to each of the
banks before the crisis.
In Mexico, clear distinctions do not exist between banks based on deposit mix.  Nonetheless, investors
charged a wide range of interest rates on liabilities to different banks in 1993, almost two years before the crisis.
 Beccause no bank in Mexico experienced a run equivalent to those experienced by some low transaction banks
in Argentina, we cannot use deposit withdrawals as a means of gauging depositor assessment of bank risk
during the crisis.  Instead, we examine whether liability holders accurately predicted the condition of banks in
1996 based on interest rates paid by individidual banks as a percent of average liabilities in 1993.  We assume
that interest rates paid by banks in 1996 reflect the true condition of a bank at that time since there has been
much publicity about bank loan quality and their need for government assistance.  Thus, Chart 7 plots interest
paid on liabilities, which is obtained from bank income statements, in 1993 for twelve Mexican banks against
interest paid on liabilities for a half year in 1996.
34  As is evident from the chart, the ordering of bank risk is fairly
similar.  These predictions would be more accurate if we could compare interest paid on specific instruments
in 1993 versus 1996, as some of the difference in relative interest rates between the two periods may be due
to changes in the structure of the liability portfolio.
                    
34We exclude banks that had very small balance sheets in 1993 and those banks that were intervened by the government, on the
assumption that the market no longer evaluates the risk of these banks as stand alone entities.43444546
2. An Examination of Tiering in Other Markets
As indicated in Charts 8a, b, and c, in three other Latin American markets, Colombia, Ecuador, and
Peru, we see evidence of interest rate tiering among banks.  These charts plot interest paid on average liabilities
against liability mix.  In all three countries, banks with very similar liability mixes have widely varying liability costs.
 If the experiences of Argentina and Mexico are any guide, those banks paying high interest rates on liabilities,
holding liability mix constant, may create problems for bank supervisors in the event of a banking crisis.4748
VI. Policy Considerations
Because of the concentration of financial and non financial wealth in Latin America and because many
banks in Latin America do not face a real market for bank stock, it is difficult for regulators to depend on capital
standards to control bank risk, even if accounting standards are improved so that asset values are more
correctly stated relative to liabilities.  However, as the experience in industrial countries demonstrates, regulators
must depend on a pool of investors who evaluate bank risk from a market perspective to constrain the behavior
of risky banks.  If investors did not extract a heavy price for providing equity to risky institutions, capital standards
would have little impact on bank risk.  This implies that market discipline is a necessary ingredient to enforce
successfully regulatory policies.
Because it will take time to develop liquid equity markets in the region, Latin America=s regulators must
make do with the limited markets available for pricing bank risk, which are the liability markets.  Because liability
markets provide powerful signals about the relative strength of banks, regulators= first priority must be to ensure
that these markets are working as effectively as possible. Thus, policy prescriptions can be divided in two
groups: those that can have an immediate effect in improving a country=s supervisory capacity to assess bank
soundness and those that will yield results over time. This section discusses these two kinds of policies.
1. Policies Having Immediate Impact
a. Policies designed for deposit markets.
To sharpen the signals about bank risk available from deposit markets, policy makers should
encourage the public offering of certificates of deposits so all investors can compare rates offered by the
various banks.  In addition, it would also be useful to encourage banks to announce prime interest rates to
establish a marketwide benchmark for pricing credit risk.  Publishing interbank bid and offer rates among the
various banks would also improve information flow on bank quality.  This information should be relatively
inexpensive to gather and process.
b.  Policies designed to limit access to the public safety net.
Regulators and central bank authorities must be very careful not to follow policies that encourage49
depositors in the belief that markets will always remain liquid.  For example, bank access to central bank
funding, both to settle payments and for routine borrowing, should be strictly limited.  Probably, some banks,
those with very high cost of funds, should be cut off from central bank funding all together until deposit markets
are willing to provide cheaper funds.
The Argentine data indicate that the deposit run problem seems to be less severe at high transaction
account banks, but this can create its own dangers.  Banks that feel confident that their depositors will not run
the bank may be tempted to hold risky and illiquid portfolios.  Fortunately, these risks seem to be priced in the
deposit market.  They are probably more sharply priced when these banks fund themselves in the money
market, such as large certificates of deposit and interbank funds.  Thus, an appropriate policy would be to
strictly limit these banks= access to central bank funding as well so that they are forced to meet shortages of
cash by entering the inter bank market.  If rates paid in this market are public, the transaction-oriented depositor
would gain valuable information about his bank.  It is also important to limit deposit insurance coverage to small
depositors to further encourage the pricing of risk in large deposit markets.
c.  Central Bank operating procedures and bank risk
Controlling bank risk through information provided by the deposit market requires a different set of
policies than constraining risky banks by telling them to raise more equity.  If deposits are short-term, as most
of them are in Latin America, some depositors are likely to refuse to roll over their deposits in the event of a
rapid deterioration in bank risk, as the Argentine experience demonstrates.  This implies that regulators and
central bank policymakers must be particularly concerned with the liquidity of bank assets.  To prevent bankers
from becoming overconfident about the ability of risky borrowers to remain liquid during tight credit periods,
central bank operating procedures must be designed to keep liquidity scarce, even during relatively stable
periods.  This will give bank incentives to find alternative sources of liquidity even if reserve requirements are
low. Thus, central banks should avoid engaging in policies to smooth daily fluctuations in short-term interest
rates.
35
                    
35See Rojas-Suárez and Weisbrod (1996b) for a more detailed analysis of the  interrelationships between central bank provision50
2. Policies that Yield Results over Time
No matter how efficiently the deposit and other liability markets operate, they do not give regulators the
same control over bank risk that effective equity markets would provide.  This is because, with deposit-
determined risk, the regulator lacks a prior constraint tool.  He cannot ask a risky bank to raise more deposits,
for example.  Hence, it is crucial that regulators attempt to improve the market for bank stock in their country.
 This implies consolidated supervison and perhaps requiring major stockholders of banks to publish their
personal balance sheets.  However, no matter what the rules are in this regard, equity markets are not likely
to become transparent until a diverse group of investors and users of capital enter the market.  The best way
to achieve this goal is to open the banking market up fully to foreign competition.  Such competition is not likely
to penetrate into the business and banking relationships of the local establishment, but it will provide an outside
source of capital both for the pursuit of new wealth and as a possible market stabilizer in the event of a banking
crisis.
One method by which diversity in the banking market might be encouraged is to permit foreign firms
to manage pension funds, which are expanding rapidly across the region.  Since private capital markets are
underdeveloped in most of the countries of the region, a major investment of these funds will inevitably be bank
deposits.  Foreigners will make their investments in banks with an eye toward return and safety rather than with
an eye toward cementing a business relationship.  In addition, these funds might become a source of financing
for bank capital.
                                                                   
of liquidity and its impact on bank asset quality.
It should also be noted that, in the absence of strong equity markets, the role of reserves for possible
loan loss takes on greater importance.  Hence, the regulator should insist that conservative policies provisioning
for past due loans should be followed and that provisions are made out of income rather than from transfers
from the capital account, which may not represent real capital.  In other words, the regulator should be very
strict about bank dividend policy.  Banks should not be allowed to pay dividends until the regulator is certain that
income is not overstated as a result of accruing interest on past due loans and that provisioning for non
performing loans is adequate.51
VII.  Conclusions
This paper has examined the feasibility of applying bank supervisory techniques used in the industrial
economies to the banking systems of Latin America.  Specifically, the paper considered whether risk-weighted-
capital-to-asset standards used so successfully to control bank risk in industrial countries would be a useful tool
for controlling risk of Latin American banks.  It has often been argued that such standards cannot be
successfully applied until appropriate accounting and supervisory standards are followed in the region.  In
addition, however, this paper argues that capital requirements cannot be an effective tool for restraining bank
risk unless well-developed markets for equity exist.  In the absence of such markets, equity investors do not
necessarily act as residual risk bearers, which is a necessary condition for effective capital standards.
We argue that equity markets in Latin America do not function well because of the high concentration
of wealth in the region and the resultant illiquidity of equity markets.  As a result, investors who control banks
can subvert the intent of capital requirements, even if the bank itself is subject to rigorous accounting standards.
 This is because investors in developing countries having majority interest in a bank can offset their equity
positions in a bank with a liability position, either to their own bank or to a related party.  The high concentration
of wealth has two important consequences from the regulator=s point of view:  First, the interconnection of
balance sheets implies that the probability of a shock resulting in the failure of a few banks will develop into a
systemic crisis is greater in Latin America than in industrial countries -- that is, Latin American banking systems
are more fragile than their industrial country counterpart.  Second, because the quality of bank capital is low,
available public safety nets (like deposit insurances) will be severely underpriced, creating incentives for bank
risk taking greater than those existing in industrial countries. 
The evidence presented in the paper supports the above propositions.  The fact that banks in many
countries have been able to expand their capital base at high rates of growth in short periods of time is consist
with the conclusion that bank owners can supply equity to their banks at relatively low cost.  In addition, the fact
that sources of new bank equity are not available in Latin America during a banking crisis also signifies that
equity markets are concentrated and not very liquid.52
The lack of strong markets for bank stocks has led supervisors, on a number of occassions, to shift
their attention from capital standards to liquidity requirements.  Liquidity ratios can be a useful tool during a crisis
because liquid assets are supposed to maintain their value during periods of distress.  The evidence analyzed
in this paper, however, indicates that, as with capital requirements, the effectiveness of liquidity requirements
depends on the quality of assets used to satisy the requirements.  Indeed, it is shown that the experience in
Latin America demonstrates that domestic currency denominated liquid assets are likely to become illiquid in
a crisis in terms of foreign reserve assets, which are the assets many investors want to hold during a crisis. 
Thus, it might appear to be prudent policy to require that banks hold foreign reserve assets to maintain liquidity
in a crisis.  Argentina, in fact, pursued such a policy by placing high reserve requirements on transaction
deposits.  The evidence from this Argentine experience, however, indicates that reserve requirements did not
provide liquidity to the banks that experienced the greatest loss in deposits in 1995 since these banks held
relatively few transaction (demand and savings) deposits.  Many of these banks, however, were able to remain
liquid because they held very liquid asset portfolios.  Thus, our interpretation of the evidence is that many
Argentine banks followed sound liquidity policies, not because of reserve requirements but because of the
operating procedures of the central bank that limited the supply of liquidity to banks because of the nature of
its exchange rate policy.  As a result, prudent banks realized that they must maintain their own liquidity because
they cannot depend on the central bank.
The weaknesses of both capital standards and liquidity ratios in the context of the Latin American
market raise the issue of how supervisors can identify and monitor risky banks.  Fortunately, deposit and short-
term liability markets work fairly well in identifying risky banks.  In both Argentina and Mexico, liability markets
signalled which banks would perform badly in the crisis.
The policy conclusions derived from the analysis can be divided into policies that can have an
immediate impact on bank soundness and those that will take time to yield results.  Within the first group,
appropriate policies include improving the efficiency of short-term liability markets--including disclosure of key
market rates--to facilitate identification of risky banks and limitation on public safety net devices, including lender
of last resort and deposit insurance.  They also include the avoidance of monetary policies aimed at smoothing
fluctuations in short term interest rates; instead, the design of central bank operating procedures should aim53
at keeping the cost of liquidity high.  The second group of policy measures include those necessary to improve
the performance of equity markets by improving accounting standards, increasing disclosure of consolidated
balance sheets, and increasing foreign participation in the market.54
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